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Classical finance theories neglect the impact of investor sentiment on stock 
returns. These theories assume that investors are rational and make decisions in a way 
that maximizes their wealth. However, a vast amount of research shows that investors’ 
decisions are affected by their psychological biases and feelings. These findings suggest 
that investor sentiment may have an impact on stock returns.  This hypothesis is the 
main motivation of this study. First, this study examines whether there is correlation 
among investor sentiment indicators, and whether sentiment indicators have an impact 
on stock returns in the US and other countries. Second, this study investigates whether 
a global sentiment exists in developed and emerging countries. Additionally, it examines 
the relationship between investor sentiment and anomalies. Finally, this study 
investigates a method that helps investors use sentiment information during trading 
process.  
The results of this study suggest that there is correlation among sentiment 
indicators in the US. In addition to this, several US investment indicators have a 
significant relationship with the S&P 500 index. Similar findings are found in Japan, 
Germany, China and Turkey. Moreover, this study finds that local (country) sentiment 
indicators are significantly correlated. It seems there is a global sentiment which 
impacts many countries. This global sentiment is stronger in the years between 2008 
and 2012 than in the years between 1985 and 1990 due to increased economic ties 




correlated. Furthermore, this study suggests that size, book-to-market and momentum 
anomalies can be explained by investor sentiment. Finally, the last chapter of this study 
proposes a sentiment rating system for individual stocks. In this system, stocks are 
assigned to different rating groups based on their sensitivity to sentiment changes. For 
example, a stock with very limited susceptibility to sentiment changes has AAA rating. 
An AAA rating means that a particular stock is not affected by sentiment driven 
mispricing and unexpected macroeconomic news. Therefore, the rating information can 
be used by individual investors to understand stock’ behavior under sentiment changes. 
In addition, it is found that stock groups, which have negative correlation with 




    
 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
The Classical Financial Theory is not as popular as it was 30 years ago. Market 
efficiency, rationality of people, and unlimited arbitrage opportunities are important 
components of the Classical Financial Theory that have been questioned for many years. 
The researchers have found a vast amount of evidence which states that the markets 
are not efficient, that people are not rational and that arbitrage opportunities are 
limited. There is no place for investor sentiment in the Classical Finance Theory; 
however, these new developments in finance indicate that investor sentiment may 
actually have impact on stocks. Therefore, investor sentiment must be investigated to 
understand whether a significant relationship exists between sentiment and stocks. 
In the past, investors who believed in market efficiency thought that the only 
way of beating the market was to take more risk. Nevertheless, everything changed, 
when Basu (1977) found that stocks’ earnings to price (E/P) ratio and risk adjusted stock 
returns have a relationship. After that, several researchers produced additional findings 
against market efficiency. For instance, Banz (1981) discovered that, on average, small 
stocks have more risk adjusted returns than large stocks. The momentum effect 
(Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993), contrarian effect (DeBondt & Thaler, 1985), and January 
effect ((Keim, 1983), (Reinganum, 1983)) are a few of other examples. Since all of these 
effects are deviations from market efficiency, they have categorized as anomalies. 
Interestingly,the profitability of size and the value effects vanished following the related 
papers’ releases (Schwert, 2003). Currently, investors are looking for new ways of 
beating the market without taking more risk. The motivation of this study is to 




determine whether information regarding investor sentiment can be used in order to 
beat the market.  
 Baker & Wurgler (2006) stated that the returns of stocks with specific 
characteristics are more inclined to sentiment changes. They found that size, age, 
volatility, profitability, dividend payment, growth, and being distress have impact an on 
the stocks’ sensitivity to sentiment changes. For example, Baker & Wurgler (2006)  
found that young stocks and small stocks are more inclined to sentiment changes. Even 
though these findings are helpful for investors, one cannot easily evaluate a stock since 
he or she needs to consider the above seven parameters. In order to make this 
evaluation easier, a simple model determining individual stocks’ sensitivities to 
sentiment changes can be used. By doing so, investors can understand the behavior of 
an individual stock and use this rating information to assist them in picking stocks.  
While the reasons behind stock anomalies have not been identified in the 
broader literature, several researchers claim that behavioral and psychological reasons 
might be reasons behind anomalies. If investor sentiment is the reflection of expected 
behaviors, then the impact of investor sentiment on anomalies can be statistically 
examined by using sentiment as an explanatory factor.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
Classical Finance Theory, which is based on the Efficient Market Hypothesis, has 
been questioned for many years. Its assumptions regarding the rationality of people, 
unlimited arbitrage opportunities are not supported by current research. This new 
evidence produced a novel area in finance which considers human psychology as a 
predictor of market changes. Behavioral Finance tries to explain the changes in the 
market by considering human psychology and irrationality.  
In this context, behavioral finance and investor sentiment is quite related. In a 
better explanation, investor sentiment is a topic of behavioral finance, and it can be 
defined as investors’ expectations and feelings about the market. Investor sentiment 




studies include not only sentiment and financial market relationship but also researches 
on the formation of sentiment and factors affecting it.  
In this study, the impact of sentiment on stock returns has the priority. The 
research questions are below. 
 
Research Question 1: Are there any significant relationships among indices? 
 
 Fisher & Statman (2003) stated that the University of Michigan consumer 
sentiment index and the Conference Board consumer confidence index are correlated. I 
wonder whether there is correlation among other sentiment indicators, especially 
between institutional and individual investor sentiment indicators.  
 
Research Question 2: Are several confidence indices good at predicting stock returns? 
 
 Every investor looks for ways of predicting the stock market. Some use asset 
pricing model, some use multiples and some use the vast amount of market indicators 
to succeed in predicting the market. Investor sentiment indicators may be a good 
market predictor since they reflect the expectations of investors. This study investigates 
the relationship between sentiment indicators and stock market returns. 
 
Research Question 3: Is there any evidence in other countries? 
 
Several studies ((Fisher & Statman, 2003), (Baker & Wurgler, 2006), (Brown & 
Cliff, 2005) and (Lemmon & Portniaguina, 2006)) showed that sentiment has impact on 
stock returns in the US stock market. I wonder whether this relationship exists in other 
countries. 
 
Research Question 4: Is Sentiment Global? 
 




Strong economic ties connect countries together. When there is a recession in 
one market, others are also affected because investors are able to invest in securities 
traded in other countries. These economic ties and investing internationally may 
introduce common sentiment that is effective all over the world. This study investigates 
the existence of such sentiment.  
  
Research Question 5: Does sentiment explain anomalies? 
 
The Classical Finance Theory is not able to explain anomalies. Limits to arbitrage 
and psychology of investors are considered reasons for possible reasons. Since investor 
sentiment is related to the psychology of investors, it may also be a reason for 
anomalies.  
 
Research Question 6: How can investors effectively use sentiment information during 
trading process? 
  
 It is known that sentiment has impact on stock returns. However, its impact is 
not the same for all stocks. Baker & Wurgler (2006) stated seven stock characteristics 
have a role in determining sentiment sensitivity. Therefore, an average investor cannot 
assess a stock’s sentiment sensitivity easily. I wonder whether a publicized classification 
of stocks based on sentiment sensitivities can help investors use sentiment information.  
  
 
1.3 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 is designed as an introduction to behavioral finance. At first, market 
efficiency and its assumptions are presented. Then evidence in favor of and against 
market efficiency is presented. At this point, anomalies, which are deviations from 
market efficiency, are defined. After that, behavioral finance, which is introduced as an 




explanation to anomalies, is explained with its two components: limits to arbitrage and 
psychology.   
Chapter 3 presents the direct and indirect sentiment indicators. Graphics 
illustrate the relationship between the S&P 500 index and sentiment indicators. Then, it 
shares the correlation among sentiment indicators. 
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between sentiment indicators and stock 
returns. First, the relationship between the S&P 500 index and sentiment indicators is 
analyzed; then, the same relationship is searched in other countries. In addition to this 
analysis, relationships among countries’ sentiment indicators are examined. Chapter 4 
also questions whether size and industry are proxies for stocks’ sensitivities to 
sentiment changes. In other words, it questions whether the impact of sentiment is 
similar on all size and industry portfolios.  
Chapter 5 answers whether sentiment can explain anomalies.  
Chapter 6 measures the sensitivity level of individual stocks to the sentiment 
changes, and classifies stocks based on their inclination to sentiment changes. Stocks in 
different groups are assigned to ratings, and then rating information is used while 
picking stocks.  











CHAPTER 2. INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) claims that the only way of beating the 
market or earning more return is taking more risk. According to EMH, all information 
about stocks is available for everyone, and prices reflect the new information as soon as 
it is released.   
However, the vast amount of research showed there are strategies that can beat 
the market without taking more risk. In other words, the classical asset pricing models 
are not able to explain these strategies. These strategies (deviations from asset pricing 
models) are called anomalies.  
The research findings against the EMH introduced Behavioral Finance which 
considers human psychology while explaining price movements in the financial markets. 
According to Behavioral Finance studies, investors may have several biases such as 
overconfidence, endowment, and self-attribution that may lead them toward bad 
decisions. In addition to the above, Behavioral Finance literature claims that anomalies 
exist because of behavioral biases.  
In this chapter, the Efficient Market Hypothesis will be presented along with its 
assumptions and different types (weak, semi-strong and strong). Evidences for and 
against the EMH will be examined in section 2.1. Anomalies will be explained in section 
2.2 with their possible reasons for existing. The last section introduces Behavioral 
Finance as a contrary to the Efficient Market Hypothesis and an explanation to 
anomalies. 
2.1 Market Efficiency 
Market efficiency has been a very popular research subject since Fama's (1970) 
paper. Fama (1970) stated that in efficient markets prices indicate all accessible




information and new information will be priced very fast. In other words, over or under 
valuations should not exist for a long time.      
In Fama's (1970) paper, the market efficiency was presented within three 
different forms as weak, semi-strong and strong. The weak form efficiency indicates that 
prices display all information about historical prices. The semi-strong form indicates that 
prices display all information about historical prices plus publicly available information. 
The strong form indicates that prices display private information as well.   
There are several evidences in favor of market efficiency. The first one is that 
mutual funds do not beat the market persistently (Malkiel, 1995) . With this evidence, 
one may assert that all information available to everyone and the only way to make 
higher return is to take more risk. Therefore, persistency cannot be achieved.  
There is much more evidence against market efficiency than in favor of market 
efficiency. The evidence against market efficiency can be classified into three groups as 
information efficiency, efficiency forms, and anomalies.  
Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) claimed that investors who spend their resources to 
have more information  earn more return, and since collecting information is not 
free, the markets cannot be efficient in terms of information.   
In the literature, there are evidences against all forms of efficiency. According to 
weak form, strategies using historical prices should not work. Nevertheless, momentum 
strategy shared by Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) does not support this form. One may 
assert that strategies using income statement or balance sheet should not help 
investors make more profit according to semi-strong form efficiency. Nonetheless, Basu 
(1977) argued that earnings to price (E/P) ratio and risk adjusted stock returns are 
related to each other. The strong form argues that insider trading should not provide 
extra profit. However, there is evidence that insider trading helps to have more profit 
(Seyhun, 1986).  
If there is market efficiency, strategies based on under-reaction and over-
reaction should not consistently work in the market. However, the momentum effect, 
(Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993), which is the result of underreaction, and contrarian effect 




(DeBondt & Thaler, 1985), which is the result of overreaction, have been working in the 
market. There are other strategies such as size effect (Banz, 1981) and January effect 
((Keim, 1983), (Reinganum, 1983)) which are evidence against market efficiency. 
Deciding on whether market efficiency exists is a quite complicated process. To 
decide on that, one needs to know the right prices of stocks. Researchers are using asset 
models such as Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) ((Sharpe, 1964), (Lintner, 1965), (F 
Black, 1972)) to assess the right price. However, the price found by using CAPM may not 
be the right price. In other words, when deviations from the asset pricing models are 
found, it may indicate that there is evidence against market efficiency or that the model 
has a problem. Therefore, it is very difficult to know which one is right. This issue was 
termed as Joint Hypothesis Problem in the literature (Fama, 1991).  
 
2.2 Anomalies 
The vast amount of research found several trading strategies help to earn more 
return without taking more risk. These strategies, which are deviations from market 
efficiency, are called anomalies. The most well-known anomalies are size, book-to-
market, momentum, and reversal anomalies.   
Banz (1981) showed that on average, stocks with small market capitalization gain 
more risk adjusted return than large stocks on average. After his paper, this finding was 
termed as size effect, and it became very popular. In a special issue, the Journal of 
Financial Economics published seven papers covering size effect (Schwert, 1983). Apart 
from academics, financial companies were excited about the size effect. For example, 
Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA) started to use size effect as a strategy (Schwert, 2003). 
However,  it is interesting that the size effect was not in the market after 1982 (Schwert, 
2003).  
The second deviation form market efficiency is value effect.  Basu (1977) found 
relationship between earnings to price (E/P) ratios and risk adjusted stock returns. In 
addition, book-to-market ratios and stock returns are positively correlated in the US 




market (Fama & French (1992)). Other than the US market, a similar relationship is 
found in the Japanese stock market (Chan, Hamao, & Lakonishok, 1991). However, this 
relationship is not able to be explained by the asset-pricing model of Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965) and Black (1972). According to Fama & French (1992), stocks with higher 
book-to-market ratios outperform stocks with lower book-to-market ratios even though 
there is no significant risk difference; thus producing the term book-to-market anomaly.  
Momentum effect is another deviation from market efficiency. Jegadeesh & 
Titman (1993) formed a portfolio by picking stocks that had a great performance in the 
past three months to one year (-12, -3). Then, they formed another portfolio by picking 
stocks that had worst performance in the same time period. After that they bought the 
winning portfolio and sold the losing portfolio. Finally, they found that this strategy 
provide positive returns in the next three months to one year (3, 12). Jegadeesh & 
Titman (1993) stated momentum is not related to the riskiness of stocks. In addition, 
macroeconomic factors are not able to explain momentum, and it exists in many other 
countries (Griffin, Ji, & Martin, 2003).    
DeBondt & Thaler (1985) ranked stocks based on their past three years’ results 
and formed two portfolios; one consists of winners and the other consists of losers. 
They stated that losers beat the winners in the next three years. After this paper, 
authors published another paper for further evidence. DeBondt & Thaler (1987) picked 
the best and the worst 50 stocks to form two portfolios based on stocks’ previous five 
year performances and they found the portfolio of worst stocks beat the portfolio of 
best stocks in the next five years. Reversal (contrarian) strategy suggests buying the 
outperforming portfolio and selling the underperforming portfolio. DeBondt & Thaler 
(1985) stated this reversal is due to overreaction of investors. As mentioned earlier, 
according to the EMH, information should be priced correctly and swiftly. Because of 
this reason, reversals (contrarian) strategy is called an anomaly.     
Other than size, value, momentum and reversal effects, the literature presents 
several more anomalies such as January effect ((Keim, 1983), (Reinganum, 1983)) and  
asset growth (Cooper et al., 2008).    In different papers, Keim (1983) and Reinganum 




(1983) found small stocks earn more return in January than other months. Cooper et al. 
(2008) stated portfolios with low asset growth beat the portfolios with high asset 
growth. 
As mentioned earlier, market efficiency is inadequate to explain anomalies. The 
existence of anomalies is explained by behavioral biases and under/overreaction.  For 
example, reversal anomaly exists due to overreaction of investors (De Bondt & Thaler, 
1985b).  Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) stated momentum anomaly exists because of 
under-reaction of investors to information about firms. 
Even though the impact of some anomalies vanished after the introduction of 
them (Schwert, 2003), the strong findings about anomalies mitigated the power of the 
Classical Finance Theory. Market efficiency, which is the most important assumption of 
Classical Finance Theory, does not make sense anymore. In addition, research on 
cognitive science weakened Classical Finance Theory’s second assumption; rationality of 
people. The vast amount of researchers showed that people are not rational and that 
have a variety of behavioral biases. The research on these two assumptions unveiled a 
new area - behavioral finance.    
 
2.3 Behavioral Finance 
According to Behavioral Finance, financial models should assume some investors 
are not rational  (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). Behavioral Finance generally works on two 
topics: the limits the arbitrage and psychology.  
 
2.3.1 The Limits of Arbitrage   
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the price of a security is the same 
as the security’s fundamental value, which is today’s value of all future cash flows of the 
security. In this sense, it is thought that if there is a deviation from the right price, it will 
disappear with the help of arbitrageurs (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). 




Arbitrage opportunity can be defined as a situation in which an investor can 
make profit without taking any risk (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2009). However, Barberis & 
Thaler (2003) stated that arbitrage opportunities may be expensive and dangerous due 
to fundamental risk, noise trader risk, and implementation costs.  
While arbitrageurs try to take advantage of mispricing, negative news related to 
a security may disable arbitrageurs to make profit. This kind of risk is defined as 
fundamental risk (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). 
Noise is the opposite of information, and noise trading is not the way of earning 
positive returns (Fisher Black, 1986). Noise trader risk may lead arbitrageurs to stay 
liquated so that opportunities cannot be exploited (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).   
Transaction costs discourage investors to take advantage of arbitrage 
opportunities (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). Also, selling short is prohibited for mutual funds 
(Barberis & Thaler, 2003) so that implementing an arbitrage opportunity may be quite 
risky in some cases.  
2.3.2 Psychology  
The previous section showed that limits to arbitrage seem to be a good reason 
for the existence of anomalies. Rational investors are not able to fix mispricing due to 
the risk and cost of arbitraging. Sometimes these deviations (mispricing) from the 
fundamental prices result from investors’ biases. Cognitive psychologists presented 
several biases that may have impact on the trading process by running a vast amount of 
experiments. Overconfidence, framing, mental accounting, availability, conservatism, 
endowment, ambiguity aversion, and loss aversion are examples of these biases that 
presented in this section.  
2.3.2.1 Overconfidence 
An overconfident investor may undermine the new information against his or 
her judgment so that the investor may make bad trading decisions. Svenson (1981) 
asked people to evaluate their driving abilities in Sweden. The answers were surprising: 




77% of survey participants considered themselves above the average. The result 
suggests that people have a tendency to exacerbate their abilities.  
Frequent trading mitigates the return of investors (Barber & Odean, 2000), and 
since overconfident investors trade more (Odean, 1998), overconfidence bias has 
another negative effect other than making bad decisions.  
2.3.2.2 Framing 
People’s decisions vary under different framings (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). It 
may be because people change their behavior when they are faced with the probability 
of loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). According to these authors, Prospect Theory, which 
states that risk loving behavior appears if there is loss in the framing, may be an 
explanation for this bias.  
2.3.2.3 Mental Accounting 
 Benefits and costs of different things are not evaluated in the same account and 
some expenses can be more important to people (Thaler, 1999). For instance, people 
may visit a store very close to them in order to have a $10 discount for food but not for 
a $10 discount for a movie theatre ticket. Such behavior is termed as mental accounting.  
2.3.2.4 Availability  
 Availability is a bias that leads people to use the information they have at the 
moment of decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, if someone is 
asked if lightening kills more people in the United States or if tornados do, he or she 
may select tornados due to broad media coverage of tornado deaths despite lightening 
being the correct answer (Pompian, 2006). 
 





  Conservatism bias is the tendency to keep the previous position while there is 
new information against the previous position; thus, this bias may help momentum 
strategies (Bodie et al., 2009).  
2.3.2.6 Endowment Effect 
 While selling things, people may ask for more money than the fundamental 
value (Thaler, 1980). In the literature, it is called an endowment effect. 
2.3.2.7 Ambiguity Aversion 
 While deciding on an option, people select the one with its components’ 
probabilities are known (Ellsberg, 1961). This fact is termed as ambiguity aversion in 
literature.  
2.3.2.8 Loss Aversion 
 Loss aversion can be defined as paying more attention to not losing anything 
than winning something (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).  
  
2.4 Conclusion  
The vast amount of findings against Market Efficiency and the Classical Finance 
Theory introduced Behavioral Finance. The new theory of finance assumes that some 
investors are irrational (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). Research on limits of arbitrage, 
especially on noise traders, and psychological biases supported this assumption.  
Behavioral Finance attempts to explain anomalies and the role of psychology in 
these anomalies. It does this with two research components: limits of arbitrage and 
psychological biases.  




The research on limits of arbitrage help explain mispricing. Fundamental risk, 
noise trader risk, and the cost of implementing arbitrage strategies indicate that 
removing mispricing is not easy or cheap.  
According to Behavioral Finance, mispricing results from irrational investors. The 
psychology component of Behavioral Finance shows that biases lead investors towards 
bad decisions resulting in mispricing. For example, conservatism bias may help 
momentum strategies (Bodie et al., 2009). Similar examples are available in the related 
literature.  
With its two components, limits to arbitrage and psychology, Behavioral Finance 
attempts to explain anomalies that cannot be explained by the Classical Finance Theory. 
Considering the evidence, Behavioral Finance has made a substantial progress in 





















CHAPTER 3. WHAT IS INVESTOR SENTIMENT? 
Investor sentiment can be defined as the expectations and feelings of investors 
about market conditions. For several decades, it has been believed that investor 
sentiment has an impact on stock returns. 
The Classical Finance Theory assumes that people are rational and make the 
decision to maximize outcome. In this theory, there is no place for sentiment because 
people’s feelings and expectations about the market do not impact stocks. However, 
Behavioral Finance is quite related to investor sentiment since the psychology of 
investors is another topic of Behavioral Finance.  
In this section, several sentiment indicators will be presented and the 
relationship among these indicators will be examined. 
  
3.1 Investor Sentiment Indicators 
There are various indicators in the US market which measure the sentiment by 
using different methods. In this study, sentiment indicators are classified into two 





Direct Indicators Indirect Indicators 
Sentiment 
Indicators 
 Figure 3.1 Investor Sentiment Indicators 




Direct indicators use surveys to measure sentiment, whereas indirect indicators 
use different market variables.  
The indirect indicators in this study are classified into two groups as market wide 
and institutional. Put/Call Ratio, Closed-end-fund discounts and Baker & Wurgler 
(2006)’s sentiment index are market wide indicators. These indicators measure market 
wide sentiment, whereas the State Street investor confidence index measures 
institutional investors’ sentiment.  
The direct indicators in this study are the University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index, the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index, Gallup Economic 
Confidence Index, Gallup Economic Conditions, Gallup Economic Outlook, and the 
American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) Sentiment Survey.  
As it is seen, consumer confidence indices are also considered sentiment 
indicators in this study. Even though the respondents of confidence indices may not be 
real investors and questions of the surveys may not fully reflect the investor sentiment, 
several studies use confidence indices as a proxy for sentiment ((Lemmon & 
Portniaguina, 2006), (Bergman & Roychowdhury, 2008), and (Stambaugh, Yu, & Yuan, 
2012)). Considering these papers, consumer confidence indices are classified as 
sentiment indicators in this study as well. 
These are the indicators that included in this study. There are other indicators 
that are accepted as sentiment measures in the literature and in the investment 
community.  
3.1.1 Indirect Indicators 
Indirect indicators measure the sentiment by observing several other variables in 
the market. Put/call ratio, closed-end-fund discounts, composite indices, and the State 
Street Investor Confidence Index can be classified as indirect indices. The State Street 
Investor Confidence Index measures institutional sentiment. Others measure market 
wide sentiment.    




3.1.1.1 Put/Call Ratio 
Call option is a kind of derivative that gives an owner the option to purchase a 
stock at a predetermined price, whereas a put option lets the owner to sell a stock at a 
predetermined price; therefore, one may buy a call option if he or she expects the stock 
will go up or one may buy a sell option if he or she expects  the stock will go down 
(Bodie et al., 2009). 
The ratio of put options to call options is called as put/call ratio. A rise in this 
ratio is interpreted as a decrease in sentiment since investors purchase put options to 
protect their portfolios against possible market crashes (Bodie et al., 2009). Figure 3.2 
illustrates the daily put/call ratios and the S&P 500 index prices. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Put/Call Ratios1 and S&P 500 Index 
 
3.1.1.2 Closed-end Fund discounts 
Closed-end funds are a type of mutual funds in which the price deviates from its 
Net Asset Value (NAV). In order to find the NAV, the difference between the market 
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value of assets and liabilities is divided by the number of shares outstanding (Bodie et al., 
2009). While the cause of price deviations from the NAV is not fully understood, agency 
cost, tax liabilities, and illiquidity of assets are possible contributing factors (Lee, Shleifer, 
& Thaler, 1990). 
 Zweig (1973) stated that discounts on closed-end funds reflect individual 
investors’ sentiment. In addition, Lee et al. (1990) stated that the movements of closed-
end funds’ discounts indicate changes in investor sentiment.  
Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between discounts on closed-end fund2 and 
S&P500 index.  
 
Figure 3.3 Discounts on Closed-end Funds and S&P 500 
 
3.1.1.3 Baker & Wurgler (2006) Composite Index 
Baker & Wurgler (2006) introduced a composite sentiment index which has been 
widely used in the finance literature. The index considers six factors which are discount 
on closed-end funds, turnover ratio of NYSE, number of IPO, average first day returns of 
IPOs, share of equity, and dividend premium. Figure 3.4 illustrates the composite index 
and the S&P 500 index.   
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3.1.1.4 State Street Investor Confidence Index 
State Street’s Investor Confidence Index considers institutional investors’ 
holdings in risky assets3 while measuring sentiment. Since an increase in risky asset 
holdings may indicate an increase in confidence, the model presents higher point for 
index in such time periods.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Baker and Wurgler’s Sentiment Index4 and S&P 500 
 
3.1.2 Direct Indicators 
Direct indicators measure the sentiment directly by using surveys. The University 
of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, the Conference Board Consumer Confidence 
Index, Gallup Economic Confidence Index, Gallup Economic Conditions, Gallup Economic 
Outlook, and the American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey are the 
examples covered in this study.     
 
                                                     
3
 Data is available at http://statestreetglobalmarkets.com/research/pdf/summary.pdf 
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Figure 3.5 State Street Investor Confidence Index5 
 
3.1.2.1 The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index asks questions regarding 
present and future economic conditions. Table 3.1 shares these questions. The 
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index has two parts: present conditions and 
expectations. Two questions are asked to reveal the feelings about present conditions 
and three questions are asked to understand respondents’ expectations about the 
future.  
The figure 3.6 illustrates the relationship between the University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index6 and the S&P500 index over 30 years.  
 
 
                                                     
5
 The index data is available at http://www.statestreet.com/investorconfidenceindex 
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Table 3.1 Questions of the University of Michigan’s Survey7  
  
The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Survey  
Present Conditions Questions 
1. Do you think now is a good or bad time for people to buy major household items? [good time 
to buy/uncertain, depends/ bad time to buy] 
2. Would you say that you (and your family living there) are better off or worse off financially 
than you were a year ago? [better/same/worse] 
Expectations Questions 
3. Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you think that during the 
next twelve months, we’ll have good times financially or bad times or what? [good 
times/uncertain/bad times] 
4. Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely—that in the country as a whole we’ll have 
continuous good times during the next five years or so or that we’ll have periods of widespread 
unemployment or depression, or what? [good times/uncertain/ bad times] 
5. Now looking ahead—do you think that a year from now, you (and your family living there) will 
be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now? [better/same/worse] 
 
 
Figure 3.6 The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
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The University of Michigan Sentiment Index 
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3.1.2.2 The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index 
The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index uses questions similar to the 
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. Both are the most popular proxies 
for consumer confidence in the United States (Bram & Ludvigson, 1998). Table 3.2 
shares the survey questions, and figure 3.7 illustrates the Conference Board Consumer 
Confidence Index’s movements along with the S&P 500 index over 30 years.  
 
 
Figure 3.7 The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index8 
 
3.1.2.3 Gallup – Economic Confidence Index 
Gallup’s Economic Confidence Index is built by considering answers to two 
questions: economic conditions and economic outlook. Two questions are asked to 
approximately 15,000 national adults by telephone. Figure 3.8 shares the trend of this 
economic confidence index9 and S&P 500 index. 
                                                     
8
 Data is available at http://future.aae.wisc.edu/data/monthly_values/by_area/998 




































































































































































The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index 
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Table 3.2 The Questions of the Conference Board’s Survey 
The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index10 
Present Conditions Questions 
1. How would you rate present general business conditions in your area? [good/normal/bad] 
2. What would you say about available jobs in your area right now? [plentiful/not so many/hard 
to get] 
Expectations Questions 
3. Six months from now, do you think business conditions in your area will be 
[better/same/worse]? 
4. Six months from now, do you think there will be [more/same/ fewer] jobs available in your 
area? 
5. How would you guess your total family income to be six months from now? 
[higher/same/lower] 
 
3.1.2.4 Gallup – Economic Conditions 
Gallup surveys economic conditions every day. Around 15,000 respondents are 
asked to rate the conditions as excellent, good, only fair, or poor. These results are also 
used in building Gallup’s Economic Confidence Index.  Figure 3.9 shares the monthly 
ratio of poor and excellent/good answers11.  
 
3.1.2.5 Gallup – Economic Outlook 
Respondents are asked to share their opinion about whether the economic 
conditions are getting better or getting worse. The percentages are used to understand 
the future expectations. These results are also used in building Gallup’s Economic 
Confidence Index.  
 
                                                     
10
 The questions of the survey is obtained directly from Bram & Ludvigson (1998) 
11
 Data is available at http://www.gallup.com 





Figure 3.8 Gallup Economic Confidence Index 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Gallup Economic Conditions 
 
3.1.2.6 The American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey 
The American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) asks its members 
(individual investors) to share their opinions about the stock market for the next six 










































































































































Gallup Economic Confidence Index 












































































































































Gallup Economic Conditions 
S&P500 (LHS) Gallup Economic Conditions (RHS)




neutral, and bearish. The percentages of answers reflect the individual investors’ 
sentiment. Figure 3.11 illustrates the survey and the S&P 500 index.  
 
 
Figure 3.10 The American Association of Individual Investors’ Survey12 
 
3.2 Relationship Among Indicators 
Intuitively, one may assert that all sentiment indicators should be correlated. 
However, since each uses different methods and variables to measure the sentiment, 
examining these relationships would be logical.  
Table 3.3 shares simple statistics of investor sentiment indicators. Table 3.4 
shows the correlation coefficients among sentiment indicators.  According to the table 
3.4, Gallup Economic Confidence Index and Gallup Economic Outlook have a significant 
positive relationship with a 0.9 correlation coefficient and it is expected because the 
Gallup Economic Outlook is one of the components of the Gallup Economic Confidence 
Index. However, even though Gallup economic conditions index is another component 
of Gallup economic confidence index, the correlation coefficient between them is -0.3. 
The relationship is negative because the ratio of “poor” answers and “good” or 
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“excellent” answers (poor / good or excellent) is used as a variable that represents 
Gallup economic conditions. Sample size is three years for the correlation table. When 
we used five years the data, the coefficient is -0.53 for these two indices. The interesting 
finding is that Gallup economic conditions index, which surveys current conditions, is 
not correlated with Gallup economic outlook, which surveys the future. It suggests that 
current situation of market does not have significant impact on people’s expectation 
about the future.   The American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey’s 
bull ratio is positively correlated with Gallup economic confidence index (0.54) and 
Gallup economic outlook (0.56). It suggests that individual investors’ sentiment may be 
correlated with market wide sentiment. The highest correlation is between the Gallup 
economic conditions and the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index (-0.92). 
Again, the correlation is negative due to the variable definition of Gallup economic 
conditions. One would expect this correlation to be lower since the Conference Board 
has three questions about the future. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index is positively correlated with Gallup economic confidence index (0.83) and the 
Conference Board (0.63). Discounts on closed-end funds is positively correlated with 
Gallup economic conditions (0.83) and negatively correlated with conference board (-
0.69). The signs are as expected since discounts on closed-end funds are larger in 
recession times (Lee et al., 1990). Thus, there should be negative relationship between 
sentiment indices and discount on closed-end funds. Table 3.4 also shows that discounts 
on closed-end funds are negatively correlated with Baker & Wurgler's (2006) investor 
sentiment index since discounts on closed-end funds is a variable of Baker & Wurgler's 
(2006) with a negative coefficient.  Baker & Wurgler's (2006) indices are positively 
correlated because the only difference is orthogonalized one does not reflect 
macroeconomic cycles. Baker & Wurgler's (2006) investor sentiment index is positively 
correlated with the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index (0.55); however, it is 
almost not related with the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (-0.07). 
The analysis performed with larger sample size (from 1978 to 2010) suggests that Baker 
& Wurgler's (2006) investor sentiment index is not significantly correlated with the 




University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (0.25) and the Conference Board 
Consumer Confidence Index (0.18). 
 The direct indicators presented in this study can be considered individual 
sentiment since the respondents are most likely individuals that are not linked to 
institutional asset management companies. It is true that these respondents may not be 
active investors; however, they are individuals that have opinion about market 
conditions. Only the American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey is 
filled out by real individual investors so this indicator may reflect the individual investors’ 
expectations and feelings better. Since these direct indicators somehow reflect the 
individuals’ expectations about the market, one may expect significant correlations 
among these indicators. The correlation table and figure 3.12 support this hypothesis.  
 
 
Figure 3.11 : Direct Sentiment Indicators 
 
The indirect indicators do not have similarities as direct indicators have. For 
example, the State Street Investor Confidence Index measures the sentiment of 
institutional investors. Baker & Wurgler's (2006) investor sentiment index and discounts 
on closed-end funds present a market level sentiment. Once again, Baker & Wurgler's 
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discounts on closed-end funds is one of the six components of Baker & Wurgler's (2006) 
index. However, State Street Investor Confidence Index is not correlated with others. 
This result suggests that institutional sentiment may be different than market level 
sentiment.  
Table 3.3 Simple Statistics of Investor Sentiment Indicators 
GE is Gallup economic confidence index, GC is Gallup Economic Conditions, GO is Gallup 
Economic Outlook, AA is the American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey’s 
bull ratio, CB is the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index, SS is State Street Investor 
Confidence Index, MI is the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, BO is 
orthogonalized Baker & Wurgler's (2006) Investor Sentiment Index, BW is Baker & Wurgler's 
(2006) Investor Sentiment Index, and DC is discounts on closed-end funds. N shows the sample 
size. In this analysis, years from 2008 to 2010 are used.  
 
Simple Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum 
GE 36 -37.52778 12.4131 -1351 -60 -22 
GC 36 4.00692 1.46906 144.249 1.03704 7.625 
GO 36 26.80556 11.7469 965 8 41 
AA 36 0.48237 0.0892 17.3654 0.31113 0.70445 
CB 36 52.59167 11.7029 1893 25.3 87.9 
SS 36 99.80833 10.1838 3593 82.1 122.8 
MI 36 67.28333 6.30929 2422 55.3 78.4 
BO 36 -0.05122 0.24645 -1.844 -0.49 0.45 
BW 36 -0.17064 0.32506 -6.143 -0.617 0.403 
DC 36 9.18083 4.12486 330.51 1.93 18.23 
 
Direct and indirect measurements of sentiment are not related to each other. 
Only Baker & Wurgler's (2006) investor sentiment index and the Conference Board 
consumer confidence index is correlated (0.55). This result suggests that surveying 
individuals may reflect different sentiment than indirect measurements do. 




Table 3.4 Correlations among Investor Sentiment Indicators 
GE is Gallup economic confidence index, GC is Gallup Economic Conditions, GO is Gallup 
Economic Outlook, AA is The American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey’s 
bull ratio, CB is the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index, SS is State Street Investor 
Confidence Index, MI is the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, BO is 
orthogonalized Baker & Wurgler's (2006) Investor Sentiment Index, BW is Baker & Wurgler's 
(2006) Investor Sentiment Index, and DC is discounts on closed-end funds. The table explains the 
relationship among sentiment proxies. In this analysis, the years between 2008 and 2010 are 
used. 
 
  GE GC GO AA CB SS MI BO BW DC 
GE 1.00                   
GC -0.30 1.00                 
GO 0.91 0.10 1.00               
AA 0.54 -0.14 0.56 1.00             
CB 0.36 -0.92 -0.03 0.09 1.00           
SS 0.40 -0.22 0.35 0.14 0.12 1.00         
MI 0.83 -0.49 0.63 0.34 0.63 0.23 1.00       
BO -0.41 -0.60 -0.64 -0.19 0.44 -0.08 -0.11 1.00     
BW -0.38 -0.65 -0.66 -0.26 0.55 -0.35 -0.07 0.79 1.00   
DC -0.04 0.83 0.30 -0.06 -0.69 -0.09 -0.24 -0.72 -0.77 1.00 
 
 
One may expect individual and institutional sentiments not to have significant 
relationship. In order to test this hypothesis, the American Association of Individual 
Investors Sentiment Survey’s bull ratio and State Street‘s Institutional Investor 
Sentiment Index can be used. Table 3.4 shows that these indicators are not significantly 
correlated (0.14).  
Among all these indicators, Baker & Wurgler's (2006) investor sentiment index is 
currently the most popular sentiment proxy considering the number of related papers 




(some of them are (Hribar & McInnis, 2011), (Berger & Turtle, 2012), (Kurov, 2010), 




In this chapter, sentiment and its indicators are presented. Investor sentiment 
indicators are classified into two groups as direct and indirect indicators.  
Direct indicators measure the sentiment by surveying current market conditions 
and future expectations. In this study, the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index, the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index, the Gallup Economic 
Confidence Index, the Gallup Economic Conditions, the Gallup Economic Outlook, and 
the American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey are presented as 
direct sentiment indicators. Only the American Association of Individual Investors 
Sentiment Survey is asked to active investors. Other direct indicators’ respondents may 
not have investment experience. However, all direct indicators reflect the sentiment of 
individuals not institutions.  
Indirect indicators measures the sentiment by observing different variables such 
as number of IPOs (Initial Public Offering), discounts on closed-end funds and the 
percentage of holdings in risky stocks. In this study, put/call ratio, discounts on closed-
end funds, Baker & Wurgler's (2006) Investor Sentiment Index and the State Street 
Investor Confidence Index is presented as indirect sentiment indicators. All indirect 
indicators in this study reflect market level sentiment except State Street Investor 
Confidence Index, which reflects institutional investor sentiment.  
This chapter found relationship among different direct indicators. For example, 
the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index has significant relationship with 
the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index and Gallup Economic Confidence 
Index, most probably because of using very similar survey questions.  In addition, it is 
found that the American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey and State 




Street Investor Confidence Index, which reflects institutional investor sentiment, are not 
significantly correlated. In other words, institutional and individual investor sentiments 
behave differently. Last, it is found direct and indirect indicators are not correlated, 
which suggests that individual (direct indicators reflect individual sentiment) and market 
level sentiment (indirect indicators except State Street reflect market level sentiment) 

























CHAPTER 4. SENTIMENT AND STOCK RETURNS  
One reading the previous chapter may think that sentiment indicators can 
predict the stock returns since it reflects the expectations and feelings that have impact 
on trading decisions. The literature agrees with this opinion and suggests that there is 
relationship between sentiment indicators and stock returns ((Baker & Wurgler, 2006), 
(Neal & Simon, 1998), (Lee et al., 1990) and (Fisher & ; Statman, 2003)).  
In this chapter, this relationship between sentiment indicators and stock returns 
will be examined in the US stock market first. Then, similar relationship will be 
investigated in other developed stock markets: UK, Japan, Germany and Europe. It is 
wondered whether sentiment and stock return relationship exists all over the world or 
just in developed countries. To be able to answer this question, the relationship will be 
examined in emerging countries, which are China, Taiwan and Turkey, as well in this 
study.  
4.1 The Relationship between Sentiment and Stock Return 
Literature asserts that there is relationship between stock returns and sentiment 
indicators. For example,  Baker & Wurgler's (2006) state that when sentiment is high, 
the stock returns are lower in the next time period. Lee et al., (1990) suggest that 
discounts on closed-end funds may explain small stock’s return. Fisher & Statman (2003) 
claim that the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index and the Conference 
Board are able to estimate stock returns. Sentiment and stock return relationship will be 
examined by using the S&P 500 index in the next section.  




4.2 S&P 500 Returns and Sentiment Indicators 
S&P 500 index is one of the most popular indexes that represent the US stock 
market. This index consists of 500 stocks from important industries. Its adjusted market 
cap is $13,869 billion, its average market cap is $28 billion, and its most covered 
industries are information technology and consumer discretionary as of March 22, 
201313. S&P 500 index will be used as a market index in this study as it was used by 
Fisher & Statman (2003).  
In this study, all sentiment indicators data are on a monthly basis except put/call 
ratios. Put/call ratios are available on a daily basis. Table 4.1 indicates that the 
relationship between daily put/call ratios and S&P 500 stock returns is statistically 
significant. However, put/call ratios do not predict the subsequent S&P 500 returns.  
 
Table 4.1 Relationship between Put/Call Ratios and S&P 500 
 
The table shares correlation coefficients between daily put/call ratios and contemporaneous 
S&P500 returns. The signs ***, ** and * indicate significant relationship at the level of 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. Sample size (N) is 1995. 
Put/Call Ratio Correlation Coefficient 
Total put/call ratio -0.3277*** 
Index put/call ratio -0.1882*** 
Equity put/call ratio -0.3387*** 
 
Brown & Cliff (2005) stated that investor sentiment indicators estimate the next 
few years’ stock returns. By considering this finding, table 4.2 shares correlation 
between sentiment indicators and lagged S&P 500 returns (monthly). Apart from lagged 
returns, contemporaneous returns are used to evaluate the relationship between stock 
returns and sentiment indicators. Sentiment indicators and the S&P 500 Index are found 
                                                     
13
 Information about S&P500 is obtained from http://www.standardandpoors.com 




not to be significantly correlated except with the Gallup Economic Outlook (significant at 
5%). 
 Both cotemporaneous and lagged S&P returns are not significantly correlated 
with sentiment indices except Gallup Economic Outlook. Brown & Cliff (2005) used log 
of returns other than the real returns for their analysis. Table 4.2 also displays the 
correlation coefficients between sentiment indicators and log returns. 
Panel A and Panel B show very few significant relationships between sentiment 
indicators and market return. Qiu & Welch (2004) examined the relationship between 
sentiment indicators and stock returns by using change in indicators. Considering this 
paper, panel C shows the relationship between change in sentiment indicators and 
market return. In this case, State Street investor confidence index is significant.  
So far, a simple linear regression method is used to examine the relationship 
between sentiment indicators and stock market returns. One may assert that control 
variables should be used to eliminate the effect of other risk factors. In order to observe 
the relationship between sentiment indicators and market return better, Fama & 
French's (1996) three factors, which are market, size and value premium, are added to 
the regression. 
 
Rt – rft = α + β (Rm – rf)t + s(SMB)t + h(HML)t +δ (S)t-1 + ε 
 
Ri : return of S&P 500 index 
rf : risk-free rate 
Rm – rf : the difference between rf and return of value-weighted market 
portfolio  
SMB = size premium 
HML: value premium 
S : sentiment measure  
β, s, h and δ : regression coefficients 
ε : common error 




Table 4.2 Correlation between Indicators and S&P500 Returns 
GE is Gallup economic confidence index, GC is Gallup Economic Conditions, GO is Gallup 
Economic Outlook, AA is the American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey’s 
bull ratio, CB is the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index, SS is State Street Investor 
Confidence Index, MI is the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, BO is 
orthogonalized Baker & Wurgler's (2006) Investor Sentiment Index, BW is Baker & Wurgler's 
(2006) Investor Sentiment Index, and DC is discounts on closed-end funds. GE, GC, GO and AA 
are between January 2008 and December 2012 (N: 60). SS is between January 2004 and 
December 2012 (N: 108). MI, BO, BW, BC, DC and CB are between January 1978 and December 
2010 (N: 396). The table shares correlation coefficients between sentiment indicators and 
contemporaneous, one month, and two month lagged S&P500 returns. The signs ***, ** and * 
indicate significant relationship at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 




S&P500 Index  -
Contemporaneous 
S&P500 Index - 
1 month lagged 
S&P500 Index - 2 
months lagged 
MI -0.00675 -0.00246 0.00086 
BO -0.07068 -0.06756 -0.06124 
BW -0.06389 -0.05586 -0.05494 
BC 0.00908 -0.01888 0.08735* 
DC 0.0324 0.02559 0.04925 
CB -0.03601 -0.03497 -0.02558 
GE 0.23637* 0.17579 0.19847 
GC 0.15024 0.19569 0.17573 
GO 0.30032** 0.23034* 0.25781* 
AA 0.0924 -0.03079 0.17771 
SS 0.1126 -0.0133 -0.056 
 
 




Table 4.2 (continued) 
Panel B. Correlation between Sentiment Indicators and log S&P500 Returns 
Indicators S&P500   S&P500 (t+1)  S&P500 (t+2)  
MI -0.00418 0.00005 0.00285 
BO -0.0724 -0.06917 -0.06293 
BW -0.06536 -0.05738 -0.05654 
BC 0.00865 -0.01538 0.08723* 
DC 0.02907 0.02258 0.04631 
CB -0.03471 -0.03404 -0.02486 
GE 0.24959* 0.18893 0.21253 
GC 0.13824 0.18565 0.16913 
GO 0.31074**  0.24199*   0.27024** 
AA 0.1031 -0.02244 0.18623 
SS 0.121811742 -0.004013916 -0.047857989 
 
Panel C. Correlation between Change in Sentiment Indicators and log S&P500 Returns 
 ∆ Indicators S&P 500 S&P500 (t+1) S&P500 (t+2) 
MI -0.02615 -0.01988 0.00484 
BO 0.09807* -0.04103 -0.04561 
BW -0.07555 -0.04208 0.07805 
BC 0.01037 -0.03409 -0.09087* 
DC 0.04694 0.03057 -0.05315 
CB 0.00777 -0.04583 -0.01931 
GE -0.07345 0.02047 -0.18165 
GC -0.11776 0.04535  -0.33588**   
GO 0.1412 -0.21906* -0.0469 
AA 0.09561 -0.25655* 0.22037* 
SS 0.25162*** 0.09536 0.20812** 
 




Similar regression function is used by Baker & Wurgler (2006), adding 
momentum as another control variable. Baker & Wurgler (2006) use previous month’s 
sentiment value to perform a predictive model.  
 
Table 4.3 Sentiment Indicators and S&P500 Returns with Control Variables 
Abbreviations are the same with table 4.2. GE, GC, GO and AA are between January 2008 and 
December 2012 (N: 60). SS is between January 2004 and December 2012 (N: 108). MI, BO, BW, 
BC, DC and CB are between January 1978 and December 2010 (N: 396). 
The multi-regression equation is Rt – rft = α + β (Rm – rf)t + s(SMB)t + h(HML)t +δ (S)t-1 + ε. Ri is 
return of S&P 500 index, rf is risk-free rate, Rm – rf is the difference between rf and return of 
value-weighted market portfolio, SMB is size premium, HML is value premium, S is sentiment 
measure,  ε is common error, and β, s, h and δ are regression coefficients. 
The table shares t-values of sentiment indicator’s coefficients. Thus, higher t-values suggest 
significant relationship between sentiment indicator and S&P 500 index. The signs ***, ** and * 









S&P500 Index(t) and 
change in indicators(t-2) 
MI 0.15 0.33 -0.83 
BO -1.64 -1.56 1.73* 
BW -1.34 -1.19 -1.7* 
BC -1.03 -0.2 0.48 
DC -0.12 -0.2 0.96 
CB -0.74 -0.68 -0.01 
GE 1.22 -0.17 -0.38 
GC 1.07 0.13 -0.37 
GO 1.62 -1.5 0.87 
AA -0.11 -2.21** 0.21 
SS 2.43** 2.334** 5.32*** 




The findings suggest that State Street Investor Confidence Survey may be a good 
proxy for the overall market in the US. Several sentiment indicators do not have 
significant relationship with the S&P 500 index. Additionally, these results suggest that 
stocks in the S&P 500 index due to their large market capitalizations. This hypothesis will 
be examined in the next sections.   
  
4.3 Evidence in Other Countries 
The previous section showed that sentiment indicators have impact on stock 
prices in the US stock market. One may ask whether this relationship exists in other 
countries. To answer this question, sentiment surveys data are collected for Japan, UK, 
Germany, Euro-area, China, Taiwan and Turkey. The relationships between sentiment 
surveys and the countries’ stock indices (representing the overall market) are examined.  
 
4.3.1 Japan 
The Economic and Social Research Institute at Cabinet Office of Government of 
Japan releases monthly consumer confidence data14. This survey aims to understand 
changes in the opinion of consumers in the economy and it covers over 50 million 
households excluding students, institutions and people from different countries. 6,720 
households are surveyed in the middle of each month. The Consumer Confidence Index 
has four parts: “overall livelihood”, “income growth”, “employment” and “willingness to 
buy durable goods”. Respondents are asked to evaluate these parts for the following six 
months by giving grades from one to five. Figure 4.1 illustrates the confidence index and 
its parts.  
The NIKKEI (NKY) index consists of 225 Japanese companies, and it is one of the 
proxies of Japanese stock market followed by the financial communities all over the 
world. Figure 4.2 illustrates the relationship between Japanese Consumer Confidence 
Index and NIKKEI. 
                                                     
14
 Information about index is available at http://www.cao.go.jp/index-e.html 




Table 4.4 indicates that there is statistically significant relationship among parts 
of consumer confidence index.  
 
 

















































































































































Consumer Confidence Index in Japan  
Consumer Confidence Index Overall livelihood
Income growth Employment























































































































































Consumer Confidence Index and NIKKEI Index  
Consumer Confidence Index (LHS) NIKKEI (RHS)




Table 4.4 Confidence Index Components 
 
Panel A shares correlation coefficients among the Japanese Consumer Confidence index’s 
components. Panel B. shares correlation coefficients between NIKKEI Index and the Consumer 
Confidence Index, and its components. Panel C shares t-values of regression between monthly 
NIKKEI Index return and the change in sentiment indicators in Japan  CCI is consumer confidence 
index, OL is overall livelihood, IG is income growth, E is employment, and WB is willingness to 
buy durable goods. The signs ***, ** and * indicate significant relationship at the level of 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. Monthly data 04/2004 to 01/2013 periods are used (N: 118). 
 
Panel A. Correlation among Confidence Index Components 
 
   CCI OL  IG  E  WB  
CCI 1 0.96746 0.9659 0.96554 0.94487 
OL 0.96746 1 0.92001 0.87641 0.95697 
IG 0.9659 0.92001 1 0.95733 0.84769 
E 0.96554 0.87641 0.95733 1 0.84327 
WB 0.94487 0.95697 0.84769 0.84327 1 
 
Panel B. NIKKEI and Sentiment Indicators 
 
  Correlation Coefficients (t) 
   CCI OL   IG E  WB  
NIKKEI (t) 
0.16339* 0.21987** 0.13185 0.09353 0.2154** 
NIKKEI (t+1) 
0.10655 0.16856* 0.06847 0.03627 0.17046* 
 
Panel C. NIKKEI and Change in Sentiment Indicators 
  t-values  
   CCI OL   IG E  WB  
NIKKEI (t) 
2.46** 1.93* 1.66* 2.99*** 1.98* 




 Additionally, table 4.4 suggests the NIKKEI and Japanese Consumer Confidence 
Index have a significant contemporaneous relationship. In addition, table 4.4 suggests 
that “overall livelihood” and “willingness to buy durable goods” can predict the 
subsequent NIKKEI returns. When the changes in sentiment indicators are regressed 
with NIKKEI, all indicators seem significant. 
 One may assert the previous regression (or correlation) does not consider 
control variables that might be the real reason of the relationship. To be able to answer 
this question, control variables need to be used along with the confidence index. Fama 
& French (1996) introduced a three-factor asset pricing model that uses market, size 
and value premiums as control variables. French’s data library contains these factors 
and momentum factors for Japan15. Fama & French's (1996) three factors, momentum 
factors, and consumer confidence index will be used as independent variables to explain 
the excess return of NIKKEI.  
 
Rt – rft = α + β (Rm – rf)t + s(SMB)t + h(HML)t + w(WML)t +δ (S)t-1 + ε 
 
where Ri is return of NIKKEI, rf is risk-free rate, Rm – rf is the difference between rf and 
return of value-weighted market portfolio, SMB is size premium, HML is value premium, 
WML is momentum premium, S is sentiment measure,  ε is common error, and β, s, h, w 
and δ are regression coefficients. 
Table 4.5 indicates that when control variables are used, consumer confidence 
components are not able to predict the market returns. However, overall liveliness and 
willingness to buy durable goods are still significantly related to the NIKKEI return. Panel 
B shows changes in sentiment indicators, except income growth, are significantly 
correlated with NIKKEI.  
 
 
                                                     
15
 Data is available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 




Table 4.5 NIKKEI Index and Sentiment Indicators with Control Variables 
Panel A shares t-values of regression between the monthly NIKKEI Index return and sentiment 
indicators in Japan. Panel B shares t-values of regression between monthly NIKKEI Index return 
and change in sentiment indicators in Japan. CCI is consumer confidence index, OL is overall 
livelihood, IG is income growth, E is employment, and WB is willingness to buy durable goods. 
The signs ***, ** and * indicate significant relationship at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.  Monthly data 04/2004 to 01/2013 periods are used (N: 118). 
 
Panel A. NIKKEI Index Return and Sentiment Indicators 
 
  t-value (t) 
   CCI OL   IG E  WB  
NIKKEI (t) 
1.40 2.01** 1.22 0.75 1.80* 
NIKKEI (t+1) 
0.90 1.52 0.63 0.30 1.36 
 
Panel B. NIKKEI Index and Change in Sentiment Indicators 
  t-value (t)  
   CCI OL   IG E  WB  
NIKKEI (t) 
2.10** 1.73* 1.50 2.32** 1.78* 
 
All in all, we observe that the Consumer Confidence Index prepared by the 
government of Japan is related to the market returns. Therefore, there is evidence of 
sentiment and stock return relationship in Japan.  
 
4.3.2 Europe Area (Eurozone) 
The European Commission releases monthly economic sentiment indicators16 for 
the Euro Area and European countries. Each economic sentiment indicator has 5 
                                                     
16
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.htm 




components: “industrial confidence” (40%), “services confidence” (30%), “consumer 
confidence” (20%), “retail trade confidence” (5%), and “construction confidence” (5%).  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Eurozone Economic Sentiment Indicator and STOXX 50 Index 
 
The STOXX 50 index, which consists of 50 stocks from euro area, is used as a 
proxy for the Euro Area’s stock market.  
Table 4.11 indicates change in the Euro Area’s economic sentiment indicators 
and monthly return of the STOXX 50 is not significantly correlated at 0.05 levels; 
however, there is a positive correlation between them (p-value: 0.11). Interestingly, it is 
found the DAX index, which represents the German stock market, is significantly 
correlated with the change in the Euro Area’s economic sentiment indicators.  
Similar regression is performed by considering momentum and Fama/French 
Factors17 as control variables.  
 
Rt – rft = α + β (Rm – rf)t + s(SMB)t + h(HML)t + w(WML)t +δ (∆S)t 
 




























































































































































Eurozone Economic Sentiment Indicator 
STOXX50 (LHS) Economic Sentiment Indicator (RHS)




Table 4.6 Correlation of Euro Area’s Sentiment Indicator with STOXX 50 and DAX 
Panel A shows the relationship of change in the Euro Area’s economic sentiment indicator with 
STOXX 50 and DAX without using control variables. Panel B shows the relationship of change in 
the Euro Area’s economic sentiment indicator with STOXX 50 and DAX by considering 
momentum and Fama/French Factors as control variables. The regression: Rt – rft = α + β (Rm – 
rf)t + s(SMB)t + h(HML)t + w(WML)t +δ (∆S)t . Ri is return of STOXX 50 and DAX indices, rf is risk-
free rate, Rm – rf is the difference between rf and the return of value-weighted market portfolio, 
SMB is size premium, HML is value premium, WML is momentum premium, S is sentiment 
measure,  ε is common error, and β, s, h, w and δ are regression coefficients. The signs ***, ** 
and * indicate a significant relationship at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (N: 264).   
 
Panel A. Sentiment – Stock Market Relationship without Control Variables 
 
  Dependent Variable - STOXX 50 return 
Independent Variable - Change in 
Euro Area's Economic Sentiment 
Indicator Index (monthly) 
Coefficient t-value 
0.29 1.61 
  Dependent Variable - DAX return 
Independent Variable - Change in 
Euro Area's Economic Sentiment 




Panel B. Sentiment – Stock Market Relationship with Control Variables 
  Dependent Variable - STOXX 50 (t) 
Independent Variable - Change in 




  Dependent Variable - DAX (t) 
Independent Variable - Change in 









Ri is return of STOXX 50 and DAX indices, rf is risk-free rate, Rm – rf is the difference 
between rf and the return of value-weighted market portfolio, SMB is size premium, 
HML is value premium, WML is momentum premium, S is sentiment measure,  ε is 
common error, and β, s, h and δ are regression coefficients. 
Table 4.6 indicates no significant relationship between the Euro Area’s economic 
sentiment indicator and market indices when control variables are used.  
4.3.3 Germany 
German stock index DAX will be used as a proxy for the German stock market in 
this study. Economic sentiment indicators of Germany are obtained from the European 
Commission18. Figure 4.4 illustrates DAX and the economic sentiment indicator. 
Table 4.7 suggests there is evidence for a sentiment and stock return 
relationship. Both contemporaneous and subsequent returns are related to sentiment 




Figure 4.4 Economic Sentiment Indicator and DAX Index 

























































































































































Economic Sentiment Indicator In Germany 
ESI in Germany (LHS) DAX monthly prices (RHS)




Table 4.7 Germany’s Sentiment Indicator and DAX Index’s Monthly Return (N: 264) 
 
  Dependent Variable - DAX (t) monthly return 
Independent Variable - Change in 
Germany's Economic Sentiment 
Indicators (monthly) (t) 
Coefficient t-value 
0.47 2.44** 
Independent Variable - Change in 
Germany's Economic Sentiment 





FTSE 100 index consists of 100 stocks from the London Stock Exchange and it will 
serve as the proxy for the UK market. The economic sentiment indicator of the UK is 
obtained from the European Commission. Figure 4.5 illustrates the FTSE 100 index and 
the UK’s sentiment indicator. 
 
 





























































































































































Economic Sentiment Indicator in UK 
FTSE 100 Index (LHS) ESI in UK (RHS)




Table 4.8 UK’s Sentiment Indicator and FTSE 100 Index’s Monthly Return (N: 336) 
 
  Dependent Variable - FTSE (t) monthly return 
Independent Variable - Change in UK's 




Independent Variable - Change in UK's 





Table 4.8 indicates there is no contemporaneous or subsequent relationship 
between the UK’s economic sentiment indicator and the FTSE 100 index.  
 
4.3.5 Emerging Countries 
In this section, three emerging countries, Turkey, Taiwan and China, will be 
examined in terms of a sentiment and stock return relationship.  
4.3.5.1 Turkey 
Consumer Confidence Index19 of Turkey is released monthly by the Turkish 
Statistical Institute. Respondents are asked to share their opinions about improvements 
in the household’s financial position, employment, economic conditions, and the 
likelihood of saving for the next 12 months. The respondents are surveyed in the first 15 
days of each month. 
XU100 index, which consists of 100 stocks, is used as the proxy for the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange (Borsa Istanbul)20. In this analysis, the Consumer Confidence Index is 
compared with the XU100 index.  
                                                     
19
 Confidence index data and information is available at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do 
20
 XU100 (BIST 100) data is available at http://borsaistanbul.com/en/ 




Table 4.9 indicates that change in consumer confidence index of Turkey is 
significantly correlated to the XU100 index. Thus, international evidence exists for a 
sentiment and stock return relationship in Turkey. Figure 4.6 illustrates the Turkey’s 
Consumer Confidence and XU100 index.  
 
 
Figure 4.6 Consumer Confidence Index and XU100 prices  
 
Table 4.9 Correlation between Confidence Index and Stock Market in Turkey (N: 60) 
 
  
Dependent Variable - 
XU100   
Independent Variable - Change in 
Consumer Confidence Index (monthly) 
Coefficient t-value Adjusted R 
1.039 2.68*** 0.095 
 
4.3.5.2 Taiwan 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted Index (TSEC)21 will be used as a proxy for 
their stock market. The Consumer Confidence Index22 of Taiwan is shared monthly with 
                                                     
21










































































































































Confidence Index and XU100 
Consumer Confidence Index (LHS) XU100 (RHS)




the investor community, and has 6 components: prices, household financial situation, 
employment, business and willingness to buy durable goods. Figure 4.7 illustrates both 
indices.  
 
Figure 4.7 Sentiment Indicator and Stock Market Index in Taiwan 
 
Table 4.10 Correlation between Confidence Index and Stock Market in Taiwan (N: 38) 
 
  
TSEC Index (t) 
Correlation Coefficient 
Change in Consumer Confidence (t) 0.0748 
Change in Consumer Confidence (t-1) -0.0794 
 
According to the table 4.10, there is no significant relationship between Taiwan’s 
consumer confidence index and the TSEC index. This comparison was produces by using 
data between 2001 and 2004 due to the lack of confidence index data in English. More 
recent data is obtained from Taiwan Research Institute’s website23 and translated. The 
                                                                                                                                                              
22
 Data and information about confidence index is available at http://rcted.ncu.edu.tw/e_intro.phtml 
23






































































































































Consumer Confidence Index of Taiwan 
Consumer Confidence Index (LHS) TSEC Index (RHS)




recent 5-year data (2008, 2013) presents a very similar result (correlation coefficient: 
0.075).  
4.3.5.3 China 
Three indices 24 , which are the Consumer Confidence Index, Consumer 
Expectation Index, and Consumer Satisfaction Index, related to consumer sentiment are 
released each month by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. It is found that the 
Consumer Expectation and the Consumer Satisfaction Indices are not significantly 
correlated to each other (correlation coefficient: 0.31). The Shanghai Composite Index25 
is used as the proxy for the Chinese stock market.  Figure 4.8 illustrates these three 
indices and the Shanghai composite index.  
 
 




                                                     
24
 Confidence index data  is available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/ 
25

















Consumer Confidence Index of China 
Consumer Expectation Ind. (LHS) Consumer Satisfaction Ind. (LHS)
Consumer Confidence Ind. (LHS) Shanghai Composite Ind. (RHS)




Table 4.11 Correlation between Confidence Index and Stock Market in China 
 
  Monthly Return of  Shanghai Composite Index  
Monthly Change in Indices  Correlation Coefficient 
Consumer Expectation Index (t) 0.46** 
Consumer Satisfaction Index (t) 0.22 
Consumer Confidence Index (t) 0.40** 
Consumer Expectation Index (t-1) 0.14 
Consumer Satisfaction Index (t-1) 0.15 
Consumer Confidence Index (t-1) 0.1 
 
Unfortunately, the available sample size for the Consumer Confidence Index of 
China is limited (sample size: 25). The analysis performed with the available data 
suggests that changes in consumer expectation index as well as changes in consumer 
confidence index have a significant relationship with the Shanghai Composite Index.  
 
4.4 Is Sentiment Global? 
The previous sections indicated that local (country) sentiment indicators have 
the power to explain stock returns. Since the world is economically connected, one may 
wonder whether countries’ sentiment indicators are correlated. 
Table 4.12 shows the sentiment indicators of Taiwan, Japan, Euro area, UK, 
France, Germany, Turkey and US are significantly correlated at a 1% level from 2008 and 
2012. 
However, the table also indicates from 1985 to 1990, the relationships were not 
as significant as they were from 2008 to 2012; with the exception of the France and the 
US sentiment relationship (only five countries were used due to limited data). This 
increase in sentiment correlation may be due to advancements in online trading, since 




online trading started in 1994 in the US26. Additionally, online media and increased 
economic relationships among countries may be other potential reasons.  
Since there are correlations among countries’ sentiment indicators, similar 
correlations can exist among countries’ stock returns as well. As shown in table 4.13, 
with the exception of the UK and US stock markets (S&P 500 and FTSE 100 indices), 
stock market indices are significantly correlated at least at the 10% level.  
In conclusion, there is a global sentiment based on the evidence, and it is partly 
valid in many countries. In addition, global sentiment is likely becoming stronger with 
the help of online trading, online media, and development of economic relations. In 


















                                                     
26
 https://www.tdameritrade.com/about-us.page 




Table 4.12 Relationships among Countries’ Sentiment Indicators 
Panel A shares the correlation coefficient among countries’ sentiment indicators. All coefficients 
are significantly correlated at the 1% level. Monthly values of years between 2008 and 2012 (N: 
60) are used. Panel B shares the correlation coefficient between countries’ sentiment indicators 
in the years between 1985 and 1990 (N: 72). Only five sentiment indicators are used due to 
limited data. 
 
Panel A: Relationship between 2008 and 2012  
 
  T J E  UK F G Tur US 
Taiwan 1               
Japan 0.66 1             
Eurozone 0.76 0.50 1           
UK 0.74 0.67 0.90 1         
France 0.69 0.40 0.98 0.87 1       
German 0.89 0.56 0.96 0.87 0.91 1     
Turkey 0.82 0.80 0.70 0.72 0.64 0.75 1   
US 0.46 0.47 0.53 0.66 0.52 0.57 0.52 1 
 
 
Panel B. Relationship between 1985 and 1990 
 
   Euro area UK France German US 
Euro area 1 -0.07671 0.906875 0.833367 0.44005 
UK   1 0.283 -0.553 0.594 
France     1 0.554767 0.682267 
German       1 -0.04307 








Table 4.13 Relationships among Countries’ Stock Indices (2008 – 2012) 
Table shares the correlation coefficients among countries’ stock indices (N: 60). Stock market 
indices used: NIKKEI 25 Index for Japan, S&P 500 Index for the US, STOXX 50 Index for the Euro 
area, DAX is for Germany, FTSE 100 index for UK, CAC 40 Index for France, and STEC Index for 
Taiwan. 
 
  J US E G UK F T 
Japan 1 0.220857 0.722144 0.724129 0.717565 0.718122 0.635097 
US   1 0.282134 0.378557 0.196843 0.265878 0.127712 
Euro area     1 0.93017 0.889103 0.980618 0.689432 
Germany       1 0.831368 0.901425 0.690791 
UK         1 0.904063 0.705869 
France           1 0.708645 
Taiwan             1 
   
   
 
4.5 Is the Impact of Sentiment the Same on all Sector and Size Portfolios  
Section 4.2 presents evidence of sentiment and the S&P 500 index relationship. 
Thus, one may conclude that sentiment has impact on stock returns in the US market. 
However, the S&P 500 index consists of 500 large stocks from leading industries. 
Therefore, it is not known that sentiment has similar impact on all size and industry 
portfolios. 
Table 4.14 indicates that small stocks have significant relationship with 
sentiment. This finding is in line with Baker & Wurgler's (2006) paper. 
Baker & Wurgler (2006) stated that the impact of investor sentiment is bigger on 
stocks which are hard to arbitrage. In other words, they claimed that stocks with some 
specific characteristics behave in line with the sentiment. I wondered whether the 
impact of investor sentiment varies on different industries. To be able to answer this 




question, a multi variable regression (below) is performed for 22 different industry 
portfolios27.  
Rt – rft = α + β (Rm – rf)t + s(SMB)t + h(HML)t +δ (S)t-1 
 
S is Baker & Wurgler's (2006) investor sentiment index. Its previous value is regressed 
with the excess return of 22 portfolios along with the market (Rm – rf), size (SMB) and 
value premium (HML) of Fama & French (1996).  
 
Table 4.14 Sentiment Indicators and Size Portfolios 
Table presents the results of regression between different size portfolios and sentiment 
indicator. Small is S&P Small-Cap 600 Index (N: 179), Middle is S&P Mid-Cap 400 Index (N: 232) 
and Large is S&P 500 index (N: 395). The signs ***, ** and * indicate significant relationship at 
the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
  Small Middle Large 
Sentiment Indicators t-value t-value t-value 
Change in Michigan Index 3.50*** -0.089 -0.53 
Change in Conference Board Index 5.09*** 0.32 0.13 
Change in Baker and Wurgler's Index 4.31*** 1.05 0.19 
 
Table 4.15 indicates that very few industries are related to investor sentiment 
index of Baker & Wurgler (2006).  For example, when sentiment is high, the portfolio 
consists of stocks from the food products industry have high return in the following 
month. However, the steel industry has the opposite relationship.  
In conclusion, it is seen that the impact of investor sentiment is not same for all 
size and industry portfolios. Small stocks (in terms of market cap) have significant 
relationship with the sentiment; however, the majority of industry portfolios are not 
correlated with  Baker & Wurgler's (2006) investor sentiment index.  
 
                                                     
27
 Data is available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 




Table 4.15 The Impact of Investor Sentiment on Various Industries 
Table presents the relationship between Baker & Wurgler's (2006) sentiment index and 22 
different industry portfolios. Multi-variable regression equation is: Rt – rft = α + β (Rm – rf)t + 
s(SMB)t + h(HML)t +δ (S)t-1. S is Baker & Wurgler's (2006) investor sentiment index. Its previous 
value (t-1) is regressed with the excess return of 22 portfolios along with the market (Rm – rf), 
size (SMB) and value premium (HML) of Fama & French (1996). The signs ***, ** and * indicate 
significant relationship at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively (N: 396).   
 
Industry tstat Industry tstat 













Books 2.2** Carry -0.8 
Consumer Goods 1.61 Mines -1.62 
Apparel 0.39 Coal -0.75 
Healthcare 0.95 Oil -1.11 
Chemicals -0.34 Utilities -0.08 
Textiles 0.45 Communication 0.28 





In this chapter, the relationship between sentiment indicators and stock returns 
are examined. It has been found that several sentiment indicators, the Gallup Economic 
Outlook, the State Street Investor Confidence Index, the American Association of 




Individual Investors Sentiment Survey, and Baker & Wurgler's (2006) investor sentiment 
index are correlated with the S&P 500 index returns. In other words, both institutional 
and individual sentiment indicators are related to the S&P 500 index. Nevertheless, 
small stocks and some industries are more inclined to sentiment changes.  
Additionally, there is evidence of sentiment and stock relationship in Japan, 
Germany, Turkey and China. With these findings it can be concluded that sentiment and 
stock return relationship is international.   
Finally, it is also found there is significant correlation among local (country) 
sentiment indicators. These correlations are stronger from 2008 to 2012 than 1985 to 























CHAPTER 5. SENTIMENT AND ANOMALIES 
As explained in chapter 2, anomalies are deviations from market efficiency. Asset 
pricing models of Classical Finance Theory are not able to explain these deviations. The 
literature suggests that limits to arbitrage and behavioral biases are the reasons for 
anomalies (see chapter 2). This chapter examines whether there is a relationship 
between investor sentiment and market anomalies.  
 
5.1 Can Sentiment Explain Anomalies? 
Stambaugh et al. (2012) found that sentiment has a positive impact on 
subsequent returns of anomalies. Stambaugh et al. (2012) used a predictive regression 
to assess the effect of sentiment indicators on anomalies in the subsequent month. In 
this thesis, five anomalies, which are size, BM (book-to-market), momentum, short-term 
and long-term reversals are analyzed in terms of their relationship with sentiment 
indicators. The return data of anomaly strategies and Fama & French (1996) factors are 
obtained from French’s data library28.  
In this study, first, monthly returns of long-short strategies are calculated. For 
example, size anomaly claims on average small stocks have higher risk adjusted returns 
than larger stocks. To take advantage of this difference, size strategy longs (buy) the 
small stocks and shorts (sell) the large stocks. French’s website presents 10 portfolios 
(called deciles since the number of stocks in each portfolio is equal) which is formed on 
the basis of various anomaly strategies. Again in size anomaly case, the return of 
portfolio 1 (portfolio consists of smallest stocks) minus the return of portfolio 10 
                                                     
28
 Data is available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 




(portfolio consists of largest stocks) gives the return of long-short size strategy. Other 
strategies are calculated in a similar way. For example, portfolios of momentum strategy 
are formed based on their previous return from two months to twelve months (-12, -2). 
Decile 10 represents the portfolio which had the highest previous return. Thus, long-
short momentum strategy is calculated by subtracting decile 1 from decile 10 since it 
aims to form a portfolio that previously did well.  
After all long-short strategies’ returns are calculated, simple and multiple 
regression analyses are performed. Panel A of table 5.1 shows the results of simple 
regression between anomalies and change in the University of Michigan consumer 
sentiment index. It is found that BM (book-to-market), momentum, and short-term and 
long-term reversal strategies are correlated with the Michigan Index. It seems that BM 
anomaly works better when there is positive change in sentiment. However, when there 
is an increase in the Michigan Sentiment Index, momentum strategy goes down.  
Additionally, short-term and long term reversal strategies are positively correlated with 
the sentiment changes.   
One may assert that control variables should be used to assess the real impact of 
sentiment on anomalies. To answer this question, panel B of table 5.1 is prepared with 
the control variables. When control variables are added, sentiment’s impact on 
reversals disappears but its impact on size shows up. Panel B suggests that when 
sentiment increases, size strategy’s performance diminishes.  
Baker & Wurgler's (2006) investor sentiment is also used in this case to reveal 
the relationship between sentiment and anomalies. Table 5.2 suggests that Baker & 
Wurgler's (2006) index’s impact on size and BM is similar with the Michigan Index’s 
impact; however, there is no correlation between sentiment and momentum strategy 









Table 5.1 Change in Michigan Index and Anomalies 
Panel A presents t-values of the regression Rt  = α + δ (∆S)t +ε where Rt is excess return of long-
short anomaly strategies. Change in the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index is 
used for the comparison. Panel B presents t-values of the regression Rt  = α + β (Rm – rf)t + 
s(SMB)t + h(HML)t +δ (∆S)t where Rt is excess return of long-short anomaly strategies. The signs 
***, ** and * indicate significant relationship at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively (N: 
395).   
Panel A.  Change in Michigan Index and Anomaly Strategies’ Monthly Returns 
 
  Change in Michigan Index 
Anomaly Strategies' Monthly Returns Parameter Estimate t-value 
Size -0.06312 -1.22 
BM 0.16375 3.51*** 
Momentum -0.22327 -2.92*** 
Short-Term Reversal 0.10962 1.9* 
Long Term Reversal 0.08117 1.68* 
 
Panel B. Change in Michigan Index and Anomalies with Control Variables 
 
  Change in Michigan Index 
Anomaly Strategies' Monthly Returns Parameter Estimate t-value 
Size -0.08454 -1.78* 
BM 0.06598 2.57 ** 
Momentum -0.21513 -2.79*** 
Short-Term Reversal 0.07718 1.31 
Long Term Reversal -0.03962 -0.97 
 
Predictive regression at table 5.3 suggests that when sentiment is high, the 
return of the size anomaly will go down in the next month. Additionally, it is found 
momentum and sentiment has a positive subsequent relationship. In other words, 
momentum strategy works well following a month of high sentiment.   




Table 5.2 Change in Baker and Wurgler’s Index and Anomalies 
Table presents t-values of the regression  Rt  = α + β (Rm – rf)t + s(SMB)t + h(HML)t +δ (∆S)t  
where ∆S is change in Baker and Wurgler’s investor sentiment index. Rt is the excess return of 
long-short strategies. The signs ***, ** and * indicate significant relationship at the level of 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively (N: 395).   
 
  Change in Baker and Wurgler Index 
Anomaly Strategies' Monthly Returns Parameter Estimate t-value 
Size -0.00592 -2.26** 
BM 0.00401 2.84*** 
Momentum -0.00476 -1.11 
Short-Term Reversal 0.00056627 0.17 
Long Term Reversal -0.00316 -1.40 
 
 
Table 5.3 Michigan Index and Subsequent Return of Anomalies 
Rt  = α + β (Rm – rf)t + s(SMB)t + h(HML)t +δ (∆S)t-1 where Rt is excess return of long-short 
anomaly strategies and ∆S is the change in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index 
is used for the comparison. The signs ***, ** and * indicate significant relationship at the level 
of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively (N: 395).   
 
  Michigan Index Level (t-1) 
Anomaly Strategies' Monthly Returns (t) Parameter Estimate t-value 
Size -0.00030565 -1.71* 
BM -0.00009365 -0.96 
Momentum 0.00058416 2.00** 
Short-Term Reversal -0.00001234 -0.06 
Long Term Reversal -0.00017474 -1.14 
 
Apart from these five different anomalies, January effect is another anomaly 
mentioned in the literature. It is found the return of small stocks are higher in January 




on average ((Keim, 1983), (Reinganum, 1983)), and it is termed as “January Effect” in 
finance literature. It is wondered whether sentiment can have impact on this anomaly 
as well. Figure 6.1 shows Michigan Consumer Sentiment indicator is lower than average 
in December. Chapter 4 showed change in the Michigan Index and small stocks are 
significantly correlated (t-value: 3.5). Therefore, the significant increase in sentiment in 
January (see Figure 5.1) might be another reason of January Effect.  Furthermore,  it is 
worth nothing that BM and short-term and long-term reversals strategies work better in 
January as size strategy does (see Figure 5.2).   
 
 
Figure 5.1 The Average of Sentiment Indicators in 12-months 
 
The figure 5.1 illustrates the average levels of the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index from January to December (1 represents January and 12 represents December) and 
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Figure 5.2 Average Return of Anomaly Strategies in 12 months 
 
The figure 5.2 illustrates the average return of strategies from January to December (1 
represents January and 12 represents December) and average monthly values from 1979 to 
2010 
5.2 Conclusion 
Other than limits to arbitrage and behavioral biases, it seems that investor 
sentiment also has impact on anomalies. There is evidence size, book-to market, and 
momentum strategies are correlated with the sentiment. Additionally, the January 
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CHAPTER 6. SENTIMENT RATINGS OF INDIVIDUAL STOCKS 
The previous chapters showed investor sentiment has impact on stock returns. 
For example, there is a subsequent relationship between the State Street Investor 
Confidence Survey and S&P 500 index returns. In other words, when sentiment is high 
(low), stock returns will be high (low) in the next month. Therefore, one can use 
sentiment information during the trading process and make a profit. However, each 
stock has different sensitivity to sentiment changes. Stocks with some specific 
characteristics are more inclined to sentiment changes (Baker & Wurgler, 2006). For 
example, chapter 4 presents evidence that size and industry may be a proxy for the 
sentiment sensitivities. Therefore, one needs to know the behavior of an individual 
stock under sentiment changes when buying or selling that specific stock.   
Unfortunately, papers related to investor sentiment cannot help an investor 
evaluate an individual stocks’ behavior. Baker & Wurgler (2006) stated that … “when 
beginning-of-period proxies for sentiment are low, subsequent returns are relatively high 
for small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, un- profitable stocks, non-dividend-
paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks.” Seven criteria or more 
(there may be other criteria such as institutional ownership) need to be considered at 
the same time to evaluate a stock’s sensitivity to the sentiment changes. It is quite a 
difficult process for an average investor.   
In this chapter, we will try to help investors understand the behavior of a specific 
stock so they will be able to use sentiment information during the trading process.





Companies are ranked based on several characteristics such as financial stability 
and ability to pay back loans by rating companies such as Standard and Poor’s, Fitch, 
and Moody’s. Investors use ranking information of a stock as an indicator and invest 
accordingly. A similar rating system that represents stocks’ sentiment sensitivities can 
be used to take advantage of sentiment information. This rating information may not 
help in an efficient market where there is very limited mispricing. However, as stated in 
this study, there are sentiment-driven patterns and anomalies in stock markets. 
Therefore, knowing the behavior of a stock under sentiment changes may help investors 
to make better investment decisions. This objective can be achieved by constructing a 
rating system, which reflects stocks’ sensitivity to sentiment changes.   
In order to understand an individual stocks’ tendency to sentiment changes, 
sentiment changes are regressed with excess return of individual stocks by using Fama 
& French's (1996) three factors as control variables.  
 
Rit  = αi + βi(Rm – rf)t + si(SMB)t + hi(HML)t +δi (∆S)t 
 
∆S is change the in Baker & Wurgler's (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment index. Rt 
is the excess return of individual stocks. SMB is size premium, HML is value premium 
and Rm – rf is market premium. Monthly stock returns are obtained from Wharton Data 
Research Library29 (WRDS), sentiment changes are from Wurgler’s website30, and 
control variables are from French’s data library31. The regression model is run for 2282 
individual stocks. Since the model is stock level, it is run 2282 times. In other words, 
2282 coefficients are obtained for each independent variable. Five years data  is used 
for the regression (2004-2009). Since it is monthly data, a sample size is 60 for each 
regression.  











δi coefficient shows the direction of the relationship between an individual stock 
and sentiment changes. A positive δi coefficient means sentiment changes affect stock 
returns positively. The larger amount of δi coefficient means sentiment changes have 
stronger impact on corresponding stock.  
δi coefficients are obtained for each individual stock. These 2282 stocks are 
separated into ten groups as in Berger & Turtle (2012). Stocks with a negative δi 
coefficient are classified as the first group (decile 1). Stocks with positive coefficients are 
classified into nine equal-sized groups based on the size of δi coefficient. Decile 10 has 
the stocks with the highest δi coefficient while decile 2 has the stocks with lowest 
positive δi coefficient.  
Table 6.1 shows the deciles and corresponding ratings. If an individual stock is in 
decile 10, it means that the stock tends to behave in line with sentiment changes. Since 
unexpected macroeconomic and political news can negatively affect investor sentiment, 
stocks in decile 10 can have unexpected negative returns. Because of this reason, a C 
rating is assigned to stocks in decile 10. However, stocks that are not inclined to 
sentiment changes have AAA rating since they are not vulnerable to unexpected 
changes in the market and economy. Furthermore, since sentiment prone stocks 
frequently deviate from expected prices, predicting their returns becomes more difficult.  
Berger & Turtle (2012) allocated deciles with a similar method and  investigated 
the common characteristics of deciles. However, they assigned all stocks with negative 
δi coefficient into one decile (decile 1), which includes 45% of all stocks in our study; 
thus, they could not observe any differences among stocks with negative coefficients. 
One may wonder the differences among stocks with negative coefficients so this 
chapter investigates decile 1.  
For this purpose, decile 1 is classified into six groups (ratings). Table 6.2 shares 
negative sentiment ratings. M6 is the group with the most negative δi coefficients.   
The first question is whether there are differences in terms of riskiness among 
negative ratings. To observe the riskiness, the performance of stocks with negative 
ratings can be observed in recession times. Risky stocks are expected to have more 




negative returns. Also, spread portfolio (M6 – M1) may have positive returns in 
recession periods since M6 would behave against decreasing sentiment in recession 
periods. The period from December 2007 to June 2009 is used for this comparison since 
it is accepted as recession period in the US economy32.  
 
Table 6.1 Positive Sentiment Ratings 
 
Positive Sentiment Ratings 
Decile 2 (low) AAA 
Decile 3 AA 
Decile 4 A 
Decile 5 BBB 
Decile 6 BB 
Decile 7 B 
Decile 8 CCC 
Decile 9 CC 
Decile 10 (high) C 
 
   
Table 6.2 Negative Sentiment Ratings 
 
Negative Sentiment Ratings (Decile 1) 





M6 (the most negative) 
 
                                                     
32
 http://www.nber.org/cycles.html 




The second question is whether stocks with a different negative rating have 
common characteristics such as size and book-to-market ratio. 
 
6.2 Results 
δi coefficients are obtained for 2282 stocks and classifications are made 
accordingly. For example, according to the rating classifications, Microsoft’s (MSFT) and 
AT&T’s (T) ratings are AA while DELL’s rating is BBB. At this point, an investor may think 
that Microsoft and AT&T are not affected by the sentiment so that buying these stocks 
during uncertain economic conditions might be a good idea. Additionally, these stocks 
will not be affected by sentiment driven mispricing. 
 
Table 6.3 Monthly Average Return Differences among Deciles 
 
 Return t-stat CAPM α t-stat 
Decile 2 0.007508 1.04 0.00081 0.118 
Decile 10 0.007218 0.46 -0.00512 -0.342 
Decile 1 0.005676 0.75 -0.0007 -0.095 
10 – 2 -0.00029 -0.027 -0.0059 -0.563 
10 – 1  0.00154 0.1276 -0.0044 -0.3742 
 
Even though common characteristics and return differences of ten deciles are 
examined by Berger & Turtle (2012), I examined the average return differences among 
these ten deciles between the years of 2004 and 2009. No significant return difference 
is found among deciles.  
The minimum and maximum values of change in Baker and Wurgler’s 
orthogonalized sentiment index are -0.3527 and 4.367, respectively, from 1978 to 2010. 
The average δi coefficient of M6 group is -0.03. Since change in the index’s value interval 
is narrow and even the most negative group’s coefficient is quite small, one may not 
expect significant return differences among groups with negative coefficients.  




Table 6.4 Characteristics of Negative Ratings 
Return stands for average monthly return during the recession period (December 2007 – June 
2009). Size is average market capitalization of rating groups. For size, numbers are in million and 
rounded to the closest million. B/M ratio stands for average book-to-market ratio of rating 
groups.  
 
  M6 M5 M4 M3 M2 M1 M6-M1 
Return -0.28% -0.57% -0.82% -0.90% -0.79% -0.88% 0.60% 
Size 1343 3332 6468 8320 10062 5103 -3761 
B/M 
Ratio 89.8% 68.7% 73.3% 64.2% 60.9% 75.3% 14.4% 
 
The spread portfolio, M6-M1, has a positive average return during the recession 
as expected; however, it is not significant (t-value: 0.42). It seems that M6 has the 
smallest stocks among negative ratings and size becomes larger from M6 to M1. Berger 
& Turtle (2012) stated that size becomes smaller from decile 2 to decile 10. Thus, we 
may conclude that stocks that are not related to sentiment (positive or negative) have 









CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
7.1 Results  
The results of this study suggest that investor sentiment indicators, especially 
direct indicators, are correlated. In addition, institutional and individual investor 
sentiment indicators are not significantly related, and it seems that individual and 
institutional investors have different level of expectations for the market.  
It is indicated that some investor sentiment indicators such as the State Street 
investor confidence survey, the American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment 
Survey and Baker and Wurgler’s investor sentiment index, are correlated with monthly 
S&P 500 index returns. A similar relationship is found in other countries as well. 
Sentiment indicators and stock market indices are significantly correlated in Japan, 
Germany, Turkey and China. These findings indicate that sentiment-stock market 
relationship is valid not only in the US market but also in other markets.  
Currently, financial reports mention the impact of the US market on different 
countries and vice versa. This kind of news makes me think of the existence of a global 
sentiment. A global sentiment may have an impact on several markets related to each 
other with economic ties. In other words, there can be a significant relationship among 
local sentiment indicators. Test results suggest all local sentiment indicators are 
significantly correlated. In addition, since local sentiment indicators are correlated, local 
stock market indices are correlated as well. Sub-period analysis suggests that the 
significance of this relationship has increased after the proliferation of online 
international trading and online media. Moreover, stronger economic ties have an 
impact. As a result, one may invest in many countries by considering global sentiment 
information. 




The impact of sentiment is tested on different size and sector portfolios. The 
results suggest sentiment has a significant impact on small cap portfolios, and when 
sentiment is high, the subsequent returns of food products and book industries are high. 
Thus, investors should consider this finding while investing.  
Anomalies are one of the most discussed topics in finance literature. So far limits 
to arbitrage and psychology have been considered reasons for anomalies. This study 
examined whether sentiment can explain anomalies. The results state sentiment can 
explain size, book-to-market, and momentum anomalies. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that investors’ expectations and feelings cause deviations from the correct prices.  
Up to this point, the results of this study suggest sentiment has strong impact on 
stock returns. Several indicators have the power to predict the subsequent stock returns. 
Therefore, investors can earn positive returns by using sentiment information. However, 
one needs to consider seven or more different criteria to assess the behavior of a stock 
under sentiment changes. To make this process easier, a model is run and stocks are 
classified into ratings categories based on their behaviors under sentiment changes. 
With this rating information, an average investor can understand an individual stock’s 
behavior and invest accordingly to yield positive returns without taking more risk. 
Additionally, it is found stocks that are negatively correlated have different average 
returns in recession time and size.  
In conclusion, the results suggest that sentiment has a role in stock returns. In 
addition, it may predict stock returns and explain anomalies; however, an important 
point should be addressed before concluding this study. Sentiment indicators may 
include or reflect macroeconomic factors as well. Therefore, another reason of the 
sentiment and stock return relationship might be these macroeconomic factors. In this 
study, other than Baker & Wurgler's (2006) orthogonalized sentiment index, all 
indicators may reflect macroeconomic factors. Even Baker & Wurgler's (2006) 
orthogonalized sentiment index, in which six different macroeconomic factors are 
eliminated, may contain some other macroeconomic factors. Considering this risk, 




Stambaugh et al. (2012) also did similar elimination of macroeconomic factors for the 
University of Michigan Index. As a result, one should be aware of such risk.  
 
7.2 Future Research  
This study finds that investor sentiment indicators have a significant impact on 
small cap portfolios. This may be because of having low institutional ownership. 
Therefore, the impact of institutional ownership should be examined in future research.  
In addition, the impact of sentiment should be analyzed in more countries. The 
relationship between sentiment and stock returns may be stronger in emerging 
countries due to lack of institutional investors.  
The results of this study indicate that there might be a global sentiment which 
has an impact on stock returns all over the world. In order to analyze and address te 
global impact of investor sentiment, a global sentiment index can be created by 
considering several direct sentiment indicators. Baker et al., (2012) have conducted a 
similar study by using indirect sentiment indicators of six countries: US, Canada, France, 
UK, Germany and Japan. After creating the global sentiment index, its impact on 
different stock markets can be examined.  
In addition, the relationship between sentiment and other type of anomalies 
should be investigated.  
Moreover, the ratings can be formed using a longer time period. Different 
characteristics can be examined among deciles and negative ratings. 
Finally, since sentiment indicators may contain or reflect macroeconomic factors, 
these factors can be eliminated before examining the relationship between sentiment 
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